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I Introduction
The number of R&D cooperations has increased considerably during the past 30 years.
While in 1971 only ten percent of all firms were involved in R&D cooperations in Germany,
20 years later almost half of the firms in manufacturing industries conduct cooperative
R&D (see Ko¨nig et al., [1994]). Starting point of this development certainly were the pos-
itive results of some large R&D cooperative agreements which were established in Japan
and the USA in the seventies and eighties. Spencer and Grindley [1993] argue that the
R&D consortium SEMATECH has significantly contributed to the leading role of the US
in semiconductor industries. American supporters of R&D joint ventures (RJVs) stress
the advantages of cooperative R&D in stimulating innovative activity, an aspect also be-
coming apparent from positive experiences with cooperative R&D in Japan. The success
of German mechanical engineering in the seventies and eighties is often traced back to
part industrially financed research institutions (see Jorde and Teece [1990]).
Traditional microeconomists are often blamed for failing to develop an adequate model for
R&D cooperations. Since the end of the eighties and first half of the nineties a number
of theoretical frameworks for the analysis of R&D activity has been developed. Start-
ing from the seminal paper by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin [1988, 1990], some authors
(e.g. Kamien et al. [1992], Suzumura [1992], Choi [1993], Ziss [1994]) developed two–step
oligopoly models for cost–reducing innovations. The central message of these models is: if
externalities are high enough, R&D cooperation turns out to be effective in counteracting
too small R&D activity without affecting product market competition. These theoretical
models contributed to adjustments of the antitrust law. The antitrust law of the US as
well as of the European Community contains specific regulations allowing firms to jointly
conduct R&D. Critics of these regulations often claim that it is hardly imaginable that
cooperation can be restricted to the R&D stage alone. Further, empirical evidence in fa-
vor of R&D cooperation is dismissed. The last topic seems to be a deficit which should be
reduced especially in light of the fact that governmental R&D subsidies are increasingly
often bound to cooperative R&D.
Empirical analysis on the impact of cooperative R&D on R&D intensity and results are
rare indeed. Fo¨lster [1995] finds for Sweden that governmental subsidies of R&D co-
operations do not affect R&D investment in any direction. For SEMATECH, Irwin and
Klenow [1996] find a reduction of R&D investment and an increase in profitability of
SEMATECH members. For Germany, Ko¨nig et al. [1994] present results of a simultane-
ous equation model for R&D intensity and cooperative activity. Without distinguishing
between types of cooperative partners (customers, suppliers, universities), they find a
positive effect of cooperations on R&D investment. A positive impact of horizontal co-
operations and horizontal R&D spillovers on the R&D intensity of German firms is shown
by Inkmann [1997]. He also demonstrates that horizontal spillovers increase the tendency
to cooperate with customers. Ro¨ller et al. [1997] analyze U.S. firms which participate in
RJVs. They find a tendency towards cooperation among firms of similar size and RJV
formation to be dependent on a number of industry specific effects.
The present contribution is in line with these papers. We show that implications derived
from a cooperation model for process innovation can easily be extended to the case of
product innovations. Starting from a linear demand framework, which is extended to take
account of utilities derived from incremental product innovations, we study the determi-
nants of R&D cooperation in a three step oligopoly framework. Main hypothesis derived
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from are theoretical model are tested in the empirical part of this paper.
Our empirical evidence is broadly consistent with the theoretical framework. We find
vertical spillovers to be more important for the R&D cooperation decision and for R&D
intensity. They have a significant and negative impact on R&D expenditures and influence
firm’s decision to cooperate with customers and suppliers positively. R&D productivity
has a larger impact on R&D expenditures for cooperating than for non–cooperating firms.
In section II we present a three stages oligopoly game for R&D cooperation, R&D expen-
diture and product market competition. Main hypothesis derived from our theoretical
model are empirically tested in section IV. The data set and the variables used in the
empirical part of this paper are described in section III. Section V summarizes the results
and sketches suggestions for further research.
II A Game Theoretic Approach
II.1 Market Demand and Product Quality
The standard models for the theoretical analysis of R&D cooperations are mostly con-
cerned with process innovations. Process innovations improve supply conditions of a firm
due to decreasing production cost.1 These models are primarily based on a system of
linear demand functions. The explicit specification of the demand side is to show how
product quality can be introduced in a simple way. We assume that in the economy there
are Z identical consumers, who are endowed with an exogenously given income Y . In the
household behavior modeled here, product innovations only affect a part of household’s
demand system. M indicates the part of the income spent onthose goods not affacted
by cross–price and cross–quality effects due to changes in price and quality of product i.2
We call these goods ‘non–industrial’ hereafter since we are concerned with manufactur-
ing industries in the empirical part of this paper. The budget restriction of a household
demanding N goods is given by:
M = Y −
N∑
i=1
pi qi. (1)
The utility function to be maximized is:
U(q1, . . . , qN) =
N∑
i=1
a(qi − q
2
i
u2i
)− 2 a σ
N∑
i=1
N∑
l<i
qi
ui
ql
ul
+M. (2)
This utility function is consistent with the standard utility function used e.g. by Sutton
[1997] in a Cournot–framework or by Deneckere and Davidson [1985] in the context of
Bertrand competition. Product quality is depicted by a quality index ui, where, for
simplicity, ui > 1 is assumed. The larger ui, the higher is the utility of a household from
consumption of good qi. The parameter σ is a measure of substitutability of the N goods
and −1 ≤ σ ≤ 1. If σ = 1, the goods are perfect substitutes and if σ = −1 the goods are
1Theoretical frameworks focussing on process innovations are presented by, i.a., D’Aspremont and
Jacquemin [1988, 1990], Katz and Ordover [1990], Suzumura [1992] or Kamien et al. [1992].
2However, consumers will adjust M in order to meet the budget constraint if innovation takes place.
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perfect complements. If σ = 0, the extreme case of a monopoly is present. The utility
function has the usual properties. Market demand for good qi is represented by the sum of
individual demands of the Z identical consumers. The demand function of the households
is derived from first order conditions for the utility of a household. For simplification we
set 2a/Z = b so that the demand for industrial goods is given by a system of demand
equations of the form:
pi = a− b
u2i
qi − bσ
ui
N∑
l 6=i
ql
ul
, (3)
where qi and ql now denote market demands. Except for the quality index, we yield a
system of the usual linear market demand functions. As apparent from equation (3), an
increase in market demand (i.e., an increase in the number of consumers as well as an
increase in product quality) shifts and turns the demand function out to the right. In the
framework of the partial analysis introduced here, the simultaneous increase in product
quality is not a null sum game. In order to meet the budget constraint, households de-
crease the demand for non industrial goodsM if the quality of ‘industrial’ goods increase.
II.2 Supply and Market Equilibrium
The supply side of the model consists of N one-product firms. Following the tradition of
R&D cooperation models (c.f. Kamien et al. [1992]), market structure is modeled as a
Cournot–oligopoly. Firms can decrease production cost (process innovation) or increase
product quality (product innovation) by conducting R&D. Standard process innovation
is used as the benchmark for product innovation in order to show whether the model’s
implications are different for process and product innovation. R&D efforts do not only
contribute to production and product quality of firms conducting R&D, but also spill over
to competitors, customers and suppliers. R&D performing firms, however, have the choice
of conducting R&D in cooperation with customers, suppliers and/or competitors. In this
case, results of R&D are assumed to be fully exchanged. By performing cooperative R&D,
firms can at least partially internalize the externalities related to the R&D process.3
The deterministic R&D model suggested here falls short of real innovation processes
which are driven by risk and irreversabilities. It also is somewhat ahistorical as neither
a modeling of the intertemporal investment decision nor past R&D investment decisions
are incorporated. The model introduced here is merely related to a sequential ‘trial and
error’ process.
The briefly described model of R&D cooperation is very similar to the model of Kamien et
al. [1992] and the duopoly model of Ro¨ller et al. [1997].4 The main difference of our model
in comparison to most existing models for R&D cooperation lies in the incorporation
of product innovation. In the following, only the general model structure and main
hypotheses are sketched. These hypotheses are empirically tested afterwards. A firms’
decision to conduct either product– or process innovation is not modeled here. Both cases
are analyzed separately. Only the structure of the result is compared. The simultaneous
3Only when a certain number of trials is performed, R&D results are obtained.
4Suzumara [1992] shows that the main results of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin [1988, 1990], Kamien
et al. [1992] and others can also be obtained if more general utility functions are used.
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modeling of the decision to conduct product– and process innovation is left for future
research.5
The decision to cooperatively conduct R&D is modeled as a three stage subgame perfect
Cournot game solved by backward induction. In the third stage of the game, firms decide
upon the individual amount of output given production cost and product quality. R&D
expenditures are thus sunk endogenous cost. Their level is determined in the second
stage of the game. The type of decision reached in the first stage — whether or not to
cooperate —, yields varying profit maximization functions. The main assumptions on
production techniques, R&D spillovers and R&D production functions for product- and
process innovations are briefly introduced below. The production conditions are captured
by a linear marginal cost function ki. By conducting R&D, firms can decrease marginal
costs of their products. Denoting Xi the effective level of R&D of firm i, the marginal
cost function for firm is given by:
ki = ci − f(Xi) (4)
with f(0) = 0, f(Xi) ≤ c, f ′(Xi) > 0, f ′′(Xi) < 0, limXi→∞f ′(Xi) → 0 and (a −
ki)f
′′(Xi) + f ′(Xi)2 < 0. Expression f(Xi) denotes the production function of process
innovations. The assumptions with respect to level and form of the R&D production
function make sure that it pays for all firms to conduct R&D. We also assume that R&D
cost show a steeper increase than the returns to R&D. With respect to product innovations
the following properties of the production function for product innovations are assumed:
ui = g(Xi) (5)
with g(0) = 1, g′(Xi) > 0, g′′(Xi) < 0 and g(Xi)g′′(Xi) + g′(Xi)2 < 0.
‘Effective’ R&D investment is the only determinant of both the R&D production function
for process innovations and the production function for product innovation.6 The effective
R&D expenditures (Xi) of firm i comprise both R&D expenditures of firm i and R&D
expenditures of other firms which are received by R&D spillovers α
∑
j 6=i xj and β
∑
j 6=i xj
(c.f. Kamien et al. [1992]):
XPDi = x
PD
i + α
N∑
j 6=i
xPDj and X
PC
i = x
PC
i + β
N∑
j 6=i
xPCj (6)
for product (PD) and process (PC) innovation, respectively. The parameters α and β
incorporate the intensity of spillovers which are identical for all firms by assumption. The
larger this parameter, the more advantageous other firms’ R&D expenditure is for the firm
at hand. If α, β = 1, R&D expenditures of the other firms have the same productivity as
the own R&D expenditures. If α, β = 0, there are no spillovers. The fact that spillovers
are not always adopted costlessly is neglected here (c.f. Cohen and Levinthal [1989]).7
5As in the model of Harhoff [1997] or Levin and Reiss [1988], the relation of product to process
R&D determines the reaction of product quality or the amount of production cost. We omit the explicit
modeling since empirically, there is no sharp distinction between product and process R&D.
6Our data do not allow to separate process R&D from product R&D. Moreover, a broad majority
(80.6 percent) of the firms in our sample have introduced both product and process innovations.We thus
disregard the distinction of process and product R&D for the sake of brevity in our description of stage
3.
7The notion of an absorption capacity on own R&D efforts could be depicted by allowing α and β to
be a function of xi.
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II.2.1 Stage 3: Product market competition when R&D expenditures are
given
The N firms choose the optimal level output given parametrically sunk R&D cost. Col-
lusive agreements concerning the level of output are not allowed. Firms maximize their
profit function Πi independently from one another by choosing the optimal level of output
qi.
maxqi Πi = (pi − ki) qi − xPDi − xPCi , i = 1, . . . , N, (7)
where xPDi (x
PC
i )denotes the amount of R&D spent for product (process) innovations of
firm i.
The optimal choice of the level of output is derived using the Cournot assumption and is
given by:
q∗i =
(a− ki)u2i + σ2−σ ui
∑N
l 6=i
(
(a− ki)ui − (a− kl)ul
)
b
(
2 + σ(N − 1)
) (8)
Equation (8) show that smaller marginal cost c.p. lead to higher output levels.8 Similar
effects are present for differences in product quality: firms with superior product quality
yield higher output levels. It can also be seen that a decrease in production cost of firm j
leads to higher output levels of this firm in the case of complementary products. The same
is true for an increase in product quality of the competitor’s products. The condition for
optimal output shown by Kamien et al. [1992] is a special case under ui = uj = 1 for
substitutive products. Therefore, for both product and process innovation, an increase of
R&D expenditures leads to an increase in output. Due to spillovers, an increase of R&D
expenditures of firm i enhances product quality and, likewise, reduces production cost of
firms i 6= j. At the same time, the relative position of firms i 6= j to firm i deteriorates.
For large spillovers it can be shown that the product quality enhancing/production cost
decreasing effect can overcompensate the deterioration of the relative position of firms
i 6= j.9 This indicates incentives to form an RJV. If products are complements, even
small spillovers have positive consequences on product demand of firm i due to an in-
crease in demand of product j which in turn results from a quality improvement due to
spillovers.10 The effect of spillovers and the resulting incentives to cooperate are thus not
solely dependent on the amount of spillovers but also on the substitutability of products.
Therefore, incentives to form an RJV should differ with the type of cooperation partner.
Finally, for both process and product innovation the total level of output increases if at
least one firm increases R&D expenditures.
8The case of different marginal cost and the resulting incentives to conduct R&D in cooperation for
duopolies is analyzed by Ro¨ller et al. [1997]. The case of asymmetric marginal cost is not considered
hereafter.
9The results of sufficiently large spillovers are thoroughly discussed in the literature (cf. Suzumura
[1992], Choi [1993], Ziss [1994]). A formal exposition can therefore be omitted here.
10See Harhoff [1997] for a differenciated setting of the capturing of vertical relationships and, in the
context of vertical relationships in R&D cooperation, see Inkmann [1997].
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II.2.2 Stage 2: Determination of the R&D intensity
The decision on R&D expenditures is modeled in the second stage of the game. In the
case of independent decisions on the R&D expenditure level the maximization function is
given by:
maxxi Πi =
b
u2i
q∗
2
i − xPDi − xPCi , i = 1, . . . , N, (9)
where q∗i denotes the optimal level of output which was determined in the third stage
of the game, given the R&D effort for product, xPDi , and process innovation, x
PC
i . For
simplification, it is assumed that firms do neither have advantages nor different product
qualities over other firms except for R&D intensity. It is further assumed that firms are
also identical with respect to production functions for process and product innovation.
A symmetric equilibrium for R&D effort results under these assumptions. Therefore, the
firm subscript i is omitted. Under these assumptions in the case of competition in the
R&D stage for product innovations, the optimal R&D expenditure follows from:
2g(X∗)g′(X∗)(a− k)2
(2− σ)b
(
2 + σ(N − 1)
)2(2− σ + σ(N − 1)(1− α)) = 1. (10)
Likewise for process innovation:
2(a− k)f ′(X∗)
(2− σ)b
(
2 + σ(N − 1)
)2(2− σ + σ(N − 1)(1− β)) = 1. (11)
Both equations are very similar in structure. Large differences with respect to comparative–
static properties do not exist. Therefore, there is no need for a separate discussion of both
equations. It can be shown that results already known from Kamien et al. [1992] for pro-
cess innovation also hold for product innovation. In the case of an isolated optimization of
R&D expenditures, an increase of the spillovers induces a decrease in R&D expenditures
if goods are complements (substitutes) and spillovers are large (small). The well known
problem of underinvestment in R&D arises. The higher the degree of substitutability, the
less incentives for R&D investment exist.
If, in the first stage, firms decide to cooperate in R&D the maximization function for a
firm is given by
maxxi =
N∑
l=1
Πl with Πl =
b
u2l
q∗
2
l − xPDl − xPCl , (12)
The f.o.c.’s are:
∂Πi
∂xi
+
N∑
l 6=i
∂Πl
∂xi
= 0. (13)
The result for the optimal effective R&D in the case of product innovation is given by:
2g(X∗)g′(X∗)(a− k)2
(2− σ)b
(
2 + σ(N − 1)
)2 (2− σ)(1 + (N − 1)α) = 1 (14)
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and in the case of process innovation:
2(a− k)f ′(X∗)
(2− σ)b(2 + σ(N − 1))2 (2− σ)(1 + (N − 1)β) = 1. (15)
In the case of R&D cooperation, the spillover parameter is set to 1 since R&D cooperation
implies by definition a full sharing of R&D results. Therefore, the R&D efforts of the own
firm are as important as the R&D expenditures of other firms. The consequences for the
level of R&D expenditures in the case of R&D cooperation can be drawn from comparing
equations (10) and (14) as well as (11) and (15). Due to the internalization of spillovers,
incentives to conduct R&D are greater in the case of cooperative R&D. It can be shown
that R&D expenditures are always higher under RJV than under research competition if
goods are substitutes.
The level of R&D expenditures of a single firm, xi, and thus the sum of R&D expenditures
of all firms can either be higher or lower than without cooperation. From the increase of
the R&D spillover due to cooperation, cost sharing effects for own R&D arise. The elim-
ination of externalities also stimulates R&D expenditures. In the empirical part of this
paper it will be tested which effect is predominant. However, it is clear that the efficiency
of R&D expenditures increases on the industrial level in case of cooperation. It then fol-
lows from the properties of the innovation production function that the equilibrium with
R&D cooperation is related to a higher production efficiency or a higher product quality
than without cooperation.
We can also conclude from equations (14) and (15) that R&D expenditures under Cournot
decrease if goods are complements (substitutes) and spillovers are large (small), that R&D
expenditures increase with increasing R&D productivity, that R&D expenditures decrease
with an increase in the number of competitors provided that goods are substitutes and
that R&D expenditures increase with an increase in market demand. The latter three
propositions hold for both RJV and research competition.
II.2.3 Stage 1: Product Market Competition when R&D Expenditures are
given
The incentive for a firm to cooperatively conduct R&D becomes apparent from the com-
parison of profits with and without cooperation. The condition for starting a R&D coop-
eration is given by:
∆ = ΠJVi − ΠCi =
( b
u2i
q2i
)JV − ( b
u2i
q2i
)C − (xJVi − xCi ) > 0. (16)
In the following interpretation, it is assumed that the incentive to start a R&D coop-
eration increases with an increasing difference of profits, ∆. Under consideration of the
optimal strategies for R&D expenditures and the output level, it can be shown that the
profits of an individual firm are higher with cooperation than without cooperation. This
is valid for a wide parameter range. As it became visible from the structure of the product
innovation model, the incentives to start a cooperation are very similar for product and
process innovation. Therefore, a discussion of differences appears unnecessary.
However, the following implication should be pointed out: The incentives to start a R&D
cooperation increase if the degree of spillovers decrease. With decreasing substitutability
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of goods the incentives to cooperatively conduct R&D increase. For the empirical analy-
sis, the following hypotheses can be drawn out:
(1) R&D expenditures under Cournot decrease if goods are complements (substitutes)
and spillovers are large (small),
(2) R&D expenditures increase with increasing R&D productivity,
(3) R&D expenditures decrease with an increase in the number of competitors provided
that goods are substitutes,
(4) R&D expenditures increase with an increase in market demand,
(5) incentives to form a RJV increase if market demand increases,
(6) incentives to form a RJV decrease if the degree of substitutability increases,
(7) incentives to form a RJV decrease if the number of competitirs increases and
(8) incentives to form a RJV decrease if spillovers increase.
Propositions (2)–(4) hold for both RJV and research competition. In addition, under cer-
tain conditions higher productivity of R&D implies increased incentives to cooperate on
R&D. The theoretical model also suggests that R&D cooperations are more widespread
among suppliers and customers rather than among competitors.
These hypotheses are empirically tested in section IV. The Mannheim Innovation Panel
(MIP) of the ZEW is used as data source. This data base is described in the following
section.
III Data
The empirical analysis is based on the first five waves of the MIP, which is collected by the
ZEW and infas–Sozialforschung on behalf of the German ministry for education, research,
science and technology. A detailed description of the data material is not presented here.
The reader may refer to Janz and Licht [1999]. Basic methodological remarks and im-
plementation issues for innovation surveys are described in the OSLO-manual (OECD,
[1994]). The description presented here thus concentrates on the variables used in the
estimations and omits any further details on the data set.
R&D cooperation
R&D cooperation is defined as “R&D activities which are jointly conducted with other
firms or research institutions”. It is stressed that R&D cooperation — as opposed to
commissioned research — involves “joint active research work”. Firms which answer to
this general question in the MIP questionnaire with ‘yes’ can then choose from a list of
possible cooperation partners where multiple responses are allowed.11 That is, firms which
11First wave: Customers, suppliers, competitors, firms of own holding, consultants, universi-
ties/technical colleges, other public research institutions, privately financed research institutions, oth-
ers. Fifth wave: associated firms, competitors, customers, suppliers, consultants, universities/technical
colleges, other privately or publicly financed research institutions.
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conduct joint research with both suppliers and customers can indicate this in the MIP
questionnaire. The MIP does not contain information on the number of cooperations
a firm is involved in. This should be taken into account when interpreting estimation
results. The information on the type of cooperation partner is taken from the first (1992)
and fifth (1996) wave of the MIP.
R&D expenditure and construction of the spillover pools
R&D activity is often thought to represent the core of innovative activity. Therefore, sev-
eral questions refer to R&D issues in the MIP questionnaire. R&D expenditures is defined
in analogy to the Frascati–Manual of the OECD [1993] as expenditures for “Research and
development of new products and processes, i.e., a systematic enhancement of knowledge
and the application to new products and processes. This also comprises design and testing
of prototypes, the development of software and the acquisition of external R&D”. We use
the information on whether the firm conducted R&D in 1992 or 1996, respectively, and
the information on their level of R&D expenditures.
The level of R&D expenditure constitutes the basis for construction of spillover pools.
These spillover pools can be regarded as the empirical implementation of α
∑
j 6=i xj and
β
∑
j 6=i xj. from the theoretical model. While the sum of R&D expenditures of the various
firms can be estimated relatively easy, a measure for α and β does not exist. Straight-
forwardly, there exists a broad variety of proxy variables in the literature (cf. Griliches
[1992], Kaiser [1999] and Mohnen [1989]). The approach used here is based on each firm’s
evaluation of the hazard that own ideas might be copied. The question for imitation
hazards belongs to a group of questions on factors impeding innovative activity and was
answered by the firms on a scale ranging from 1 (= very low) to 5 (= very high). We
use a weighted sector average (3-digit NACE-rev. 1 level) as an indicator for the level
of imitation hazard in the related sectors. The weight νij for the ith firm of sector s is
the number of firms in the population which is represented by a firm in our sample. The
sector-specific indicator for imitation hazard in sector s (s = 1, . . . , S) is given by:
ωs =
∑
i∈s
νis∑
i∈s νis
H COPYis
5
(17)
H COPYis is the judgement of the ith firm of sector s for the imitation hazard concerning
their innovation. If all firms in sector s value the imitation hazard as ‘very high’, the in-
dicator takes on the value 1. We distinguish between intra– (horizontal) and intersectoral
(vertical) spillovers in order to account for the entirely different impact of vertical and
horizontal spillovers on the R&D decision (c.f. Bernstein and Nadiri [1988], Levin and
Reiss [1988]). In the theoretical framework introduced above, α and β are identical for all
firms. This assumption is relaxed in the empirical analysis. The firm–specific intrasectoral
spillovers are calculated as the weighted sum of R&D expenditures of a sector minus own
R&D expenditures. Intra–industry R&D spillovers Shis of firm i from sector s are given
by:
Shis =
∑
i∈s
(ωs R&Dis wis) − ωs R&Dis, (18)
where R&Dis denotes the R&D expenditures of firm i in sector s and wis denotes the
share of firm i’s employment in total employment of industry s. The first term of equa-
tion (18) is the weighted sum — expanded by firm weights wis — of R&D expenditures
of firm i from sector s. The calculation was made at the level of 31 different sectors. The
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spillover parameter ωs is defined in equation (17). Since the ith firm itself is part of the
sum, the second part of equation (18) subtracts own R&D expenditures weighted with
the imitation parameter .
The intersectoral spillovers are the difference between total R&D expenditures of man-
ufacturing weighted with the imitation indicator and the intrasectoral spillover pool as
well as with own R&D expenditures. From this calculation, it becomes clear that the
amount of intersectoral spillovers, which is to the disposal of firm i, is considerably larger
than the amount of intrasectoral spillovers. Even if the impact of intersectoral spillovers
is small, this effect should not be underestimated due to the mass of the interindustry
spillover pool. The firm-specific intersectoral R&D spillovers are given by:
Svis =
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(ωs R&Dis wis) −
∑
i∈s
(ωs R&Dis wis) − ωs R&Dis. (19)
The measurement of spillovers is therefore closely related to the R&D expenditures which
are released by potential ‘lender–sectors’ or competitors, respectively. However, the only
spillover of relevance for the individual firm is the one touching it directly. Thus, the
spillover variables constructed here merely present an upper bound.
Indicators for R&D productivity
For adequate consideration of firm heterogeneity the model assumption of identical in-
novation production functions is dropped in the empirical analysis. Following an idea
by Levin and Reiss [1988], we assume that sectors closely related to science stay at the
beginning of their development so they find themselves in an area of the production func-
tion with high marginal returns. The proximity of industries to science was calculated by
means of a factor analysis of the relative importance of alternative informational sources
for the innovation process. Data from the first, fourth and fifth wave of the MIP were
utilized in order to achieve a high observational density. This variable, generated by a
factor analysis, shows the importance a firm attributes to scientific information sources
(universities, technical colleges, patent system). The second factor depicts the importance
of private sources such as fairs, customer and suppliers. Both variables are generated as
firm specific factor scores, weighted by the individual valuation of information sources.
Individual factor scores are expanded to industry averages which are used to represent
the typical technological characteristics for each firm in a sector. The factor score rep-
resenting proximity to scientific information sources is denoted by SCIENCE, the factor
score representing proximity to private information source is denoted by PRIVATE.
Market structure variables
In order to capture the market structure we rely on a survey question for the number
of competitors in the market for the product with largest share of turnover, asked in the
second wave of the MIP. One of the following three alternatives are to be chosen: 1-5, 6-10
and more than 10 competitors. We use the weighted average of the number of competi-
tors at the sectoral level. Furthermore, we assume that market structure does not change
much with time. Therefore, the value for 1993 should also be valid for 1992 and 1996.
To calculate the industrial average welche Aggregationsebene???, we assign the value
3 to the 1–5 category, the value 8 to the 6–10 category and 15 to the category with no
upper limit. This variable is denoted by COMP.
As an additional indicator for market structure, export share is considered. It is calcu-
lated as the share of exports over total sales and denoted by EXPSHARE. The larger the
export share, the greater the market for an individual firm. That is, a larger export share
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is identical to a shift of the individual demand curve to the right.
Controls for observable firm heterogeneity
The sample used here captures firms of all sectors of manufacturing industries as well as
firms of different sizes. The resulting firm heterogeneity is taken into account by intro-
ducing various variables. In order to capture the heterogeneity of production- and market
conditions, the Herfindahl–equivalent number of product groups of a firm is considered.
This index is defined as
DIV ERSis =
1∑5
l=1 share
2
l,is
with share5,is = argmin(1−
4∑
l=1
sharel,is, s4,ij),(20)
where sharel,is denotes the sales share of product group l of firm i from the sth sec-
tor. In the questionnaire only sales shares of the four most important product groups
are asked for. The product share of the fifth product group is derived from the sec-
ond part of equation (20). This variable is thus equivalent to the construction of firm
number equivalents known from the literature of firm concentration measurement as the
Hirschman–Herfindahl–Index. The larger this index, the more the firm is diversified. If
the total turnover is gained from only one product group, the index variable DIVERS
takes on the value 1. If turnover is equally distributed over the five product groups,
DIVER takes on the value 5. However, if the sum of turnover shares is smaller than 1,
larger values of the diversification index are possible.
Firms may also differ with respect to financing conditions of R&D expenditure. In or-
der to capture possible financing restrictions data additional data taken from Germany’s
largest credit rating agency Creditreform are merged to the MIP.12 We use a dummy
variable which takes on the value 1 if Creditreform is unable to recommend trade credit
without objections. Hence, it can be argued that additional financing costs are imposed
on the firm, reducing financing possibilities of R&D.
In order to further control for observable firm heterogeneity, we also include five size class
dummy variables (SIZE1–SIZE5) and five sector dummies.13 The sector dummies are
denoted by FOOD (manufacture of food products), WOOD (manufacture of wood and
wood products), CHEMICALS (manufacture of chemicals), METAL (manufacture of ba-
sic metals and fabricated metal products), INSTR (manufacture of electrical and optical
equipment) and MACHINE (manufacture of machinery, base category).
We further include a dummy variable EAST for East German firms.
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in our empirical model are presented in Ap-
pendix A.
IV Empirical results
Due to the complexity of the theoretical model presented in section 2, it is not possible to
structurally estimate the equations derived there. Instead, we test the main hypothesis
of our theoretical model as summarized at the end of section II.
How can our theoretical model be implemented empirically? Our empirical analysis pro-
ceeds in two steps. First, we analyze firm’s decisions to cooperate or not cooperate.
12See Harhoff et al. [1998] for a description of this data set.
13Note that the spillover pools are generated on a 32 sector basis.
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Second, we investigate the determinants of firm’s R&D investment intensity (R&D invest-
ment scaled by sales) separately for non–cooperating, mixed and vertically cooperating
firms while taking into account the endogeneity of such a sample split by inclusion of a
Heckman [1979] — denoted by HECKCORR — correction term.
IV.1 Cooperation decision
In the theoretical model described above, it pays for all firms to conduct R&D. Hence, we
only consider those firms which actually conduct R&D although our sample also contains
835 firms which do not invest in R&D. Further, the MIP not only contains information on
whether a firm is involved in R&D cooperations, it also contains information on whether
a firm conducts joint R&D horizontally (with competitors), vertically (with customers
and/or suppliers). Since firms may be involved in both horizontal and vertical coopera-
tions, a third possibility exists which we call a ‘mixed’ cooperation.
Figure I summarizes the decisions a firms has to reach in its R&D cooperation decision
making process. In a first stage, firms decide whether or not to conduct R&D coop-
eratively. If it has decided to do joint R&D, it then has to reach a decision between
horizontal, vertical or mixed cooperation in a second stage. In a third stage firms decide
upon their level of R&D spending, given their cooperation decision.
Figure I shows that the category ‘horizontal’ cooperation is thinly populated, both in
absolute terms and in relation to the other choices. We therefore combine the horizontal
choice and the ‘mixed’ cooperation mode.14
It is important to note that the representation by a decision tree as in Figure I is of purely
analytical nature. It is not implied that time actually passes by between the individual
decisions since “one must distinguish between hierarchical behavior and hierarchical struc-
ture for the mathematical forms of the choice probabilities” (Pudney [1989], p.125). In
fact, choosing the appropriate econometric model for such a discrete choice problem is
tedious. If time actually passed by between the decision stages, a sequential model would
be appropriate. If the lower stage mattered in the decision making process of the first
stage, a nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model should be used. If firms decided simulta-
neously upon R&D cooperation and the type of cooperation partner, a multinomial logit
model (MNL) would be appropriate.15 It thus is desirable to have a flexible econometric
technique at hand which nests these types of discrete choice models. Such an estimator
has been prosed by van Ophem and Schram [1997] who show that the simultaneous and
the sequential logit model can be combined without loosing the properties of the logit
model. The sequential, the NMNL and the MNL are nested by a single parameter, λ.
The interpretation of this parameter is close to the interpretation of the coefficient cor-
responding to the inclusive value in NMNL models: For λ = 0, the utilities of the lower
stage in a decision process do not determine the utilities in the upper stages so that the
model could be sequentially estimated. If λ = 1, the decision reached in the upper stage
is determined by the maximum utility to be obtained in the lower stage leading to the
MNL as appropriate econometric tool. If λ ∈ (0, 1), an intermediate position is obtained
and the NMNL is appropriate.
The estimator suggested by van Ophem and Schram [1997] does — as opposed to the
14See Blundell et al. (1993) for a theoretical reasoning of combining choice categories.
15See Eymann [1995] for a detailed discussion of these types of models and empirical examples.
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traditional NMNL where the parameter related to the inclusive value is bounded within
[0, 1] — allow for values of λ outside the [0,1] range on statistical grounds. However, for
λ > 1 and λ < 0, there is no economic interpretation. Technical details of the van Ophem
and Schram [1997] estimator are presented in Appendix B.
We include the variables described in section III in our model of cooperation type choice.
Table I displays the estimated coefficients, standard errors and marginal effects — evalu-
ated at the means of the involved variables16 — obtained from our estimation.
The estimation results shown in Table I broadly support the hypothesis derived from our
theoretical model. Vertical spillovers have a significant and positive effect on the prob-
ability to conduct joint R&D. They further have a significantly positive impact on the
probability to choose vertically related firms as partner for R&D cooperation. Horizontal
spillovers do not have a significant impact on the decision whether or not to cooperate.
This may be caused by the combination of horizontal and mixed cooperations due to the
insufficient number of firms which conduct R&D with horizontally related firms as the
only form of cooperation. This view is supported by the positive and significant impact
of horizontal spillovers on the choice of ‘mixed’ category.
The productivity of R&D a significant impact on the decision to vertically or mixed co-
operate only. The construction of our productivity indicators SCIENCE and PRIVATE
implies that we only observe inter–industry productivity differences in R&D and assume
away within industry productivity differentials.17 SCIENCE and PRIVATE, however, al-
ways carry the expected signs and are significant in the choice of cooperation partners.
We observe a significant and positive impact of proximity to science — and thus of R&D
productivity — on the choice of more complex R&D cooperative arrangements (mixed
cooperations). Inversely, high R&D productivity leads to a decrease in the probability
to choose vertically related firms as cooperation partners. Proximity to private firms, as
depicted by the variable PRIVATE, induces firms to engaged in pure vertical relations to
R&D partners. Knowledge is gained parallel to the value added chain (e.g., by buying
or transferring knowledge via embodied technology and cooperation with suppliers and
customers). The effects of the R&D productivity variables are therefore also compatible
with the implications of our theoretical model.
The diversification index DIV ERS does not significantly influence firm’s R&D coopera-
tion decisions.
The market structure variable COMP (the number of competitors in each firm’s sector)
has a negative, though insignificant (p–value 0.125) impact on the decision whether or not
to cooperate at all while it has a significantly positive impact on the decision to cooperate
in a vertical mode. This indicates that strong market competition makes firm hesitant
with respect to horizontal cooperation.
The number of competitors, however, has a significantly positive impact on the probability
to cooperate vertically. This implies that firms tend to form vertical RJVs with increased
market competition. Expresed the other way around: The smaller the number of firms in
a sector is, the more likely cooperating firms are engaged in horizontal R&D agreements.
This is compatible with the dynamic argument that R&D cooperation can be enforced
16Taking the mean of the individual marginal effects did not lead to qualitatively differing results.
17Note that the variables SCIENCE and PRIVATE are calculated on the basis of a disaggregated 32
sector–level. Inclusion of these variables in the equations for R&D cooperation and R&D intensity does
thus not lead to a simultaneity problem.
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more easily if the number of firms in an industry is smaller.
Exportshare (EXPSHARE) do not significantly influence firm’s decision whether to
cooperate in R&D or to conduct R&D on it’s own.
Insert Table I about here!
The variables included to control for observable firm heterogeneity are not displayed in
Table I for the sake of brevity.18 We briefly summarize signs and significancy of these vari-
ables as follows: East German firms do not significantly differ from West German firms
with respect to the R&D cooperation decision and their choice of cooperation partners.
Likewise, potentially credit rationed firms do not significantly differ from non–credit ra-
tioned ones in their choice of R&D cooperation and RJV partners. The size class dummy
variables are jointly significant (p–value .037) for the decision between mixed and vertical
cooperation and indicate an increased propensity for larger firms to cooperate in a mixed
mode. Firms size does not play a significant role in the decision to cooperate at all. The
set of sector dummy variables does not have a significant impact on the initial R&D co-
operation decision but on the type of cooperation partner eventually chosen.
The coefficient λ is 3.7917 and hence outside the [0,1] range. A test of a simultaneous
model (e.g., λ = 1) cannot be accepted at the 4.3 percent marginal significance level. The
95 percent confidence interval corresponding to our estimated λ is (.538,7.045).
The goodness of fit measures is .108 and thus appropriate for these types of models.19
IV.2 R&D intensity
The increasing attention towards R&D cooperation results from the models’ implication
that R&D cooperation increase the aggregate efficiency of R&D investment. Moreover,
R&D cooperation is thought to generate R&D incentives to the individual firm. From
the theoretical framework no unequivocal effect of R&D cooperation on the dimension of
R&D investment can be derived. Two opposing effects are present: (i) The sharing of
R&D results leads to an increased R&D efficiency and thus induces R&D saving effects.
(ii) At the same time, incentives from the internalization of spillovers for exposures in
R&D occur and thus stimulate R&D investment. However, what follows is that the pres-
ence of spillovers should make a difference for firms with and without R&D cooperation.
This implication is tested hereafter.
Our empirical approach is to run OLS regressions for R&D investment for firm engaged
in RJV’s and for firms not engaged separately. We apply White’s [1980] heteroskedas-
ticity variance–covariance matrix. We then test if there exist a parameter vector which
is common to both equations by applying a Minimum Distance Estimator (MDE). The
basic methodology of the MDE is presented in Appendix C.
Our R&D intensity equation contains the same variables as the R&D cooperation decision
estimation. Instead of actually considering R&D investment, we analyze R&D investment
18The entire set of estimation results for the R&D cooperation model and the R&D
investment model as well as test statistics can be downloaded from the internet at:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/div/results.pdf.
19The pseudo R2 is the goodness of fit measure of Aldrich and Nelson [1989]. See Veall and Zimmermann
[1992] for a discussion of goodness of fit measure for qualitative dependent variables.
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intensity (R&D investment scaled by sales). We take the natural logarithm of R&D in-
tensity as dependent variable.
Insert Table II about here!
Estimation results of the R&D intensity equations are displayed in Table II. Vertical
spillovers have a negative and significant impact of R&D intensity in all equations. For
mixed or vertically cooperating firms, horizontal spillovers influence R&D intensity in a
negative and significant way while horizontal spillovers do not affect the R&D intensity
of non–cooperating firms. This implies that for cooperating firms, the cost saving effect
overweighs efficiency gains. The effects of vertical and horizontal spillovers are thus in
line with our theoretical model.
R&D productivity, as represented by the variable SCIENCE has a significant and positive
effect on the R&D intensity of both cooperating and non–cooperating firms. It has no
significant impact of the R&D intensity of non-cooperating firms. PRIVATE turns out to
be insignificant non–cooperating firms while it is positive and significant for cooperating
firms. This implies that knowledge flows on the markets are more important for cooper-
ating firms than for non–cooperating firms where proximity to science dominates.
For the coefficients of the other variables the following effects are present: The extent of
diversification has no impact on the R&D intensity of non–cooperating firms. Increased
diversification, however, leads to a decrease in R&D intensity of mixed or vertically co-
operating firms. ??? The higher the number of competitors, that is, the lower market
concentration, the lower is R&D intensity. This is in accordance to Schumpeter’s hypoth-
esis which states that market power has an R&D enhancing effect.
However, our results contradict Schumpeter’s view on firm size and innovation. We find
that R&D intensity is decreasing in firm size up to a certain point in the size distribution
of firms where R&D intensity begins to rise with size. This U–shaped R&D intensity/firm
size relation is often found in empirical studies of innovation and firm size (see Felder et.
al. [1996]). Also the industry dummies variables indicate lower R&D intensity in low tech
sectors.
Finally, we conduct Minimum Distance Estimation in order to test the hypothesis if there
is a common structure in the parameter estimates of the equations for cooperating and
non–cooperating firms. The test results are displayed in Table III. The coefficient related
to the Heckman correction coefficient is left out in these tests. Based on a Wald–type
test statistic (see Appendix C), we cannot reject a common structure of the parameter
estimates for non–cooperating, mixed and vertically cooperating firms. The same results
holds, if it is piecewise tested for common structures across the three parameter estimates.
Interestingly, the impact of horizontal spillovers on R&D intensity is significantly smaller
for vertically cooperating (p–value 0.071) and almost significantly (p–value 0.127) smaller
for mixed cooperating firms implying that the cost–sharing effect dominates the internal-
ization effect in the case of R&D cooperation.
Insert Table III about here!
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V Conclusion and suggestions for further research
In this paper, we derive a three stages oligopoly game for R&D cooperation, R&D invest-
ment and product market competition. The model captures both process and product
innovations. It is shown that the structure of optimal R&D is the same for process and
product innovation.
The most important hypothesis of our theoretical model are tested in the empirical part
of this paper. Our empirical results are in line with implications of our theoretical model.
We find that the presence of spillovers stimulates the formation of R&D joint venture. The
impact of vertical spillovers, however, is more important than that of horizontal spillovers
though our theoretical model predicts an inverse relationship. Vertical spillovers signifi-
cantly and negatively influence R&D intensity, independently of whether or not firms are
a RJV members. We do not find significant difference of the impact of horizontal and
vertical spillovers on the R&D intensity of cooperating versus non–cooperating firm. This
indicates that the cost–sharing and internalizsation effect of RJVs balance out each other.
We do not find that horizontal spillovers increase the probability of horizontal co–operations.
This is only compatible with the theoretical model if spillovers are small but may also be
caused by not explicitly modeling horizontal cooperations in our empirical model due to
a too small population of the choice horizontal cooperation.
The results presented here should be regarded as a first attempt to give empirical evi-
dence for the formation of RJVs and the impact of RJVs on R&D intensity. A number
of improvements within the present framework should be conducted in the future. First,
vertical relationships should not be modeled solely by the level of substitutability of the
products. Some models analyzing vertical relationships and vertical R&D co–operations
already exist (e.g. Inkmann [1997]). Second, the econometric devices used here do not
allow to simultaneously estimate R&D and cooperation decisions and R&D intensity. A
conditional generalized method of moments estimator as suggested by Newey [1993] —
though far beyond the scope of this paper — provides a solution to the simultaneity prob-
lem. Third, additional attention should be devoted to the construction of the spillover
pool variables. The present paper only considers the industry affiliation of a firm and the
average leak of R&D results. The data set used here contains a number of possibilities to
model the ability of a firm to assimilate ‘free available’ know–how more directly. Attempts
in this direction have recently been untertaken by Kaiser [1999].
17
Figure I
Decision Tree of Choice between Cooperation Partners
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Table I
Cooperation Decision Estimation Results
P(no cooperation) P(mixed cooperation)
base: P(cooperation) base: P(vert. cooperation)
coeff. std.err. m. eff. coeff. std.err. m. eff.
ln(Shis) 0.090 0.096 -0.005 0.113 0.083 0.020
ln(Svis) -1.209 0.327 -0.166 -0.340 0.224 -0.060
PRIVATE -0.126 0.396 0.071 -0.470 0.314 -0.083
SCIENCE 0.014 0.361 -0.146 0.736 0.363 0.129
DIVERS -0.010 0.139 0.002 -0.019 0.094 -0.003
COMP -0.082 0.071 0.007 -0.111 0.042 -0.020
EXPSHARE -0.212 0.405 -0.040 -0.007 0.303 -0.001
λ 3.919 1.701
Test Statistics χ2 (df) χ2 (df)
Firms size dummies 2.629 (4) 10.187 (4)
Sector dummies 5.809 (5) 10.489 (5)
Pseudo R2 0.108
# of obs. 2,152
Note: Table I displays estimation results of a nested logit model proposed by van Ophem and
Schram (1997). The parameter λ denotes the coefficient related to the inclusive value variable.
The Pseudo R2 is the goodness of fit measure of Aldrich and Nelson [1989], corrected by sam-
ple size. The abbreviation m. eff. denotes marginal effects, calculated at the means of the
involved variables. The specification also includes four firms size dummy variables, five sector
dummy variables, four dummy variables indicating past sales developments and a constant term.
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Table II
R&D Intensity Estimation
non–coop. mixed coop. vert. coop.
firms firms
coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err. coeff. std. err.
ln(Shis) 0.011 0.085 -0.120 0.057 -0.097 0.054
ln(Svis) -0.216 0.142 -0.195 0.100 -0.161 0.091
PRIVATE 0.029 0.203 0.297 0.158 0.395 0.145
SCIENCE 0.429 0.174 0.454 0.170 0.400 0.161
DIVERS 0.088 0.204 -0.054 0.026 -0.052 0.024
COMP -0.092 0.026 -0.066 0.018 -0.061 0.017
EXPSHARE 0.428 0.182 0.898 0.128 0.878 0.118
HECKCORR -0.238 0.267 2.89 1.01 -2.572 0.956
Test Statistics χ2 (df) χ2 (df) χ2 (df)
Firms size dummies 58.985 (4) 53.112 (4) 36.631 (4)
Sector dummies 37.016 (5) 87.396 (5) 85.614 (5)
Sales past dummies 3.889 (4) 6.168 (4) 4.614 (4)
adj. R2 0.206 0.189 0.189
# of obs. 1,487 472 193
Note: Table II displays OLS estimation results with White [1980] standard errors. The equa-
tions are estimated separately for non–cooperating, mixed and vertically cooperating firms. The
specification also includes four firms size dummy variables, five sector dummy variables, four
dummy variables indicating past sales developments, a constant and a Heckman–type correction
term — denoted by HECKCORR — for endogeneous sample selection.
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Table III
Tests for Common Parameter Structure of R&D intensity Equations
Wald–stat. p–val. df
Vertical/non–cooperating firms
entire parameter vector 50.649 0.295 46
horizontal spillover parameter only 5.295 0.071 2
vertical spillover parameter only 0.044 0.978 2
Mixed/non–cooperating firms
entire parameter vector 37.709 0.803 46
horizontal spillover parameter only 4.127 0.127 2
vertical spillover parameter only 0.354 0.838 2
Mixed/vertical cooperating firms
entire parameter vector 19.458 1.000 46
horizontal spillover parameter only 0.179 0.914 2
vertical spillover parameter only 0.205 0.902 2
Mixed/vertical/not cooperating firms
entire parameter vector 67.645 0.524 69
horizontal spillover parameter only 1.726 0.631 3
vertical spillover parameter only 0.122 0.989 3
Note: Table III displays results of tests for common structure of the estimates of the R&D
intensity equations for cooperating and non–cooperating firms. P–val. indicates the marginal
significance at which the null hypothesis of common parameter structure cannot be accepted, df
indicates the degrees of freedom. The Heckman correction type for endogeneous sample selection
is left out in any of the tests listed above.
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics
non–coop. firms vert. coop. firms mixed coop. firms
ln(R&D/sales) 1487 -4.1352 1.3401 472 -3.9038 1.2491 193 -3.6327 1.1881
ln(Shis) 1487 0.3190 1.2412 472 0.5345 1.2734 193 0.6278 1.0305
ln(Svis) 1487 3.2472 0.4641 472 3.4053 0.4510 193 3.2860 0.4659
PRIVATE 1487 0.0743 0.2423 472 0.0779 0.2358 193 0.0814 0.2241
SCIENCE 1487 0.1348 0.4107 472 0.1675 0.4287 193 0.4233 0.4064
DIVERS 1487 2.5378 6.3982 472 2.4560 1.8897 193 2.7166 2.1690
COMP 1487 9.7167 1.8788 472 9.4991 1.7725 193 9.0806 1.8282
EXPSHARE 1487 0.2255 0.2324 472 0.2658 0.2429 193 0.2939 0.2466
CREDIT 1487 0.8097 0.3927 472 0.7521 0.4322 193 0.6632 0.4738
EAST 1487 0.2569 0.4371 472 0.2246 0.4177 193 0.1451 0.3531
SIZE2 1487 0.1459 0.3532 472 0.1250 0.3311 193 0.0518 0.2222
SIZE3 1487 0.3961 0.4893 472 0.2860 0.4524 193 0.2124 0.4101
SIZE4 1487 0.3046 0.4604 472 0.3517 0.4780 193 0.3523 0.4789
SIZE5 1487 0.0874 0.2826 472 0.1864 0.3899 193 0.3575 0.4805
FOOD 1487 0.0989 0.2986 472 0.0508 0.2199 193 0.0415 0.1998
WOOD 1487 0.0881 0.2835 472 0.0508 0.2199 193 0.0155 0.1240
CHEMICALS 1487 0.2112 0.4083 472 0.2288 0.4205 193 0.2280 0.4206
METAL 1487 0.1325 0.3391 472 0.1314 0.3381 193 0.1140 0.3186
INSTR 1487 0.1762 0.3811 472 0.1780 0.3829 193 0.2694 0.4448
SALES++ 1487 0.1009 0.3013 472 0.0953 0.2940 193 0.0622 0.2421
SALES+ 1487 0.0975 0.2968 472 0.1165 0.3212 193 0.1088 0.3122
SALES- 1487 0.4351 0.4959 472 0.4280 0.4953 193 0.4611 0.4998
SALES– 1487 0.1944 0.3958 472 0.2436 0.4297 193 0.2332 0.4239
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Appendix B: The van Ophem and Schram estimator
The indirect utilities y∗d,i of the choices ‘cooperation’ (coop), ‘no cooperation’ (no coop),
‘vertical cooperation’ (vert), and ‘mixed cooperation’ (mix) for firm i (d = coop, no coop, vert,mix)
are assumed to be linear and dependent on a set of explanatory variables summarized in
row vector xi:
y∗coop,i = xiϑ + λ Ii + ωno coop,i,
y∗no coop,i = xiδ + ωcoop,i,
y∗vert(coop),i = xiα + ωvert(coop),i,
y∗mix(coop),i = xiγ + ωmix(coop),i,
(21)
where the inclusive value Ii is given by Ii = log[exp(xiα) + exp(xiγ)]. The error
terms are type I extreme value distributed. Error term ωno coop,i is independent of ωcoop,i.
Further, ωno coop,i, ωvert(coop),i, ωhori(coop),i, and ωmix(coop),i are independent. Unless λ = 0,
ωcoop,i is correlated with ωvert(coop),i, ωhori(coop),i, and ωmix(coop),i. The indicator variables
yd,i take on the value 1 if the dth option is chosen, and 0 otherwise. It follows that
Pcoop,i = P [ycoop,i = 1] =
exp(xiϑ+λIi)
exp(xiδ)+exp(xiϑ+λIi)
Pno coop,i = P [yno coop,i = 1] =
exp(xiδ)
exp(xiδ)+exp(xiϑ+λIi)
Pvert(coop),i = P [yvert = 1|ycoop = 1] = exp(αxi)exp(xiα)+exp(xiγ)
Pmix(coop),i = P [ymix = 1|ycoop = 1] = exp(γxi)exp(xiα)+exp(xiγ) .
(22)
In order to achieve identification, the following restrictions are imposed: α=0 and ϑ=0.
The loglikelihoodfunction corresponding to firm i is:
log Li =
∑
d=coop,no coop
yd,i P (d)i +
∑
d=vert,mix
yd,i P (d)i, (23)
where the first part of equation (23) corresponds to the choice between cooperation and
no cooperation and the second part corresponds to the choice between vertical, horizontal
a mixed cooperation, given the firm decided to cooperate at all in the first stage. Equation
(23) could be estimated by a two–step procedure which yielded consistent estimates for the
coefficients but not for the variance–covariance matrix since the information matrix related
to (23) is not block–diagonal. Thus, we estimated the model using a full information
maximum likelihood procedure.20
The gradients corresponding to equation (23) are given by:
∂log Li
∂δ = xi ¯ (yno coop,i − Pno coop,i)
∂log Li
∂λ
= Ii(ycoop,i − Pcoop,i)
∂log Li
∂γ = xi ¯
(
ymix,iPvert,i + Pmix,i(λ(ycoop,i − Pcoop,i)− yvert,i)
)
,
(24)
20The estimation of the van Ophem and Schram [1997] procedure as well as the Minimum
Distance Estimation were performed using our own GAUSS program based on the MAXLIK
application module. A copy of the programs can be obtained from the authors upon request.
Analytical gradients were provided in both cases. Numerical problems have not been encoun-
tered.
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where ¯ denotes elementwise products.
The marginal effects corresponding to the probabilities shown in equations (22) are:
∂Pcoop,i
∂xi = −
(
Pcoop,i Pno coop,i Pvert,i
)
¯
(
δ + exp(xiγ)¯ (δ − γλ)
)
∂Pno coop,i
∂xi = −
∂Pcoop,i
∂xi ,
∂Pvert,i
∂xi = −(Pvert,i Pmix,i)¯ γ
∂Pmix,i
∂xi = −
∂Pvert,i
∂xi .
(25)
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Appendix C: The Minimum Distance Estimator
In order to test if there is a common structure in the parameter estimates for the choice
of the alternative vertical information sources, a Minimum Distance Estimator (MDE)
is used. Minimum Distance Estimation involves the estimation of the M reduced form
parameter vectors in a first stage. In the present case, these reduced form parameters are
the parameter estimates obtained from running separate tobit regressions for the choice
alternative cooperation modes. In the second stage, the Minimum Distance Estimator is
derived from minimizing the weighted difference between the auxiliary parameter vectors
obtained in the first stage.
Besides the practical advantage that the MDE can be easily implemented empirically, it
has the further benefit that it provides the researcher with a formal test of common struc-
tures among the auxiliary parameter vectors. The MDE is derived from minimizing the
distance between the auxiliary parameter vectors under the following set of restrictions:
f(β, θˆ) = H β − θˆ = 0,
where the M · K × K matrix H imposes M · K restrictions on β. The M · K × 1
vector θˆ contains the M stacked auxiliary parameter vectors. In the present case, H is
defined by M K ×K–dimensional stacked identity matrices. The MDE is given by the
minimization of:
D = f(β, θˆ)′ Vˆ [θˆ]−1 f(β, θˆ),
β
where Vˆ [θˆ] denotes the common estimated variance–covariance matrix of the auxiliary
parameter vectors. Minimization of D leads to
βˆ = (H ′ Vˆ [θˆ]−1 H)−1H ′ Vˆ [θˆ]−1 θˆ
with variance–covariance matrix
Vˆ [βˆ] =
(
H ′ Vˆ [θˆ]−1 H
)−1
.
In the present case, where the three equations were estimated using different samples,
V [θˆ] is a matrix carrying the estimated variance–covariance matrices of the first stage
parameter vectors on its diagonal blocks.
For testing the null hypotheses that the M auxiliary parameter vectors coincide with one
another, the following Wald–type test statistics can be applied:
f(β, θˆ)′ Vˆ [θˆ]−1 f(β, θˆ) ∼ χ2M ·K .
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